Jordan’s Constitutional Amendments: A Coup against the Parliamentary System?
This paper provides a comprehensive overview of the constitutional transformations in Jordan following the 2011
protests. Firstly, it assesses the degree to which the process reflected principles of legitimacy and participation.
Secondly, it examines the responsiveness of the amendments to popular aspirations and demands. Finally, it evaluates
the implementation of the amended constitution on the ground, particularly after the subsequent amendments to
the 2011 reforms.
The paper establishes that the Jordanian Constitution defines Jordan as a parliamentary monarchy, with the King
serving as the head of state, an elected parliament, and a government that is accountable to parliament. It notes
that, in practice, the King does not exercise actual authority, resulting in a system of constitutional monarchy.
The paper then delves into the detrimental constitutional amendments that have been introduced in Jordan since
the late 1950s. It argues that these amendments have altered the fundamental nature of the country’s parliamentary
monarchy by consolidating power in the hands of the King, leading to subsequent demands for their reversal.
The paper analyzes the constitutional amendments that have been adopted since 2011 in two main sections. The
first section focuses on the 2011 amendments, which were purportedly a response to the protest movement in
Jordan and the wider region. While these amendments appeared positive on the surface, they merely aimed at
appeasing public discontent without effecting substantial changes in power dynamics. In practice, most of these
amendments were not implemented, and the underlying issues that sparked the protests remained unaddressed, as
the King and the state apparatus continued to monopolize power.